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ABSTRACT
Many governments have introduced or are considering introducing laws to recover from
the liable parties the cleanup costs caused by pollution damages. In particular, the
banks who nance the rms causing environmental damages may be considered liable.
In various court cases in the US and elsewhere, banks have been found liable, while they
have been exempted in others. We develop a multiprincipal-agent model in which the
insurance sector may insure the rm for the pollution risk and the bank may lend money
for investment. Under complete information of the bank about the rm's activities, the
limited liability of the rm induces excessive investment and insucient care but full
liability of the bank creates the appropriate internalization of the environmental risk.
This rationalization of the laws on lender liability must be qualied because in general
the banks suer from agency problems (adverse selection and moral hazard) in their
relationships with rms. In the adverse selection case, full liability of the bank leads to
underinvestment. Partial liability is better but may fail to implement the optimal second
best allocation. In the case of moral hazard, full responsibility is killing the project too
often while still leading to low care too often. Partial responsibility may achieve the
second best optimal allocation but in some cases the level of responsibility necessary to
induce the proper level of care is too high for the project to be nanced by the bank.
We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our results with regards to liability
laws for environmental damages.
Keywords: Environmental Risk, Pollution, Lender Liability, Banking, CERCLA.
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R
ESUM

E
Plusieurs gouvernements ont introduit ou pensent introduire des lois leur permettant de
recouvrer les cou^ts de decontamination aupres des parties responsables de la pollution.
Les banques des entreprises concernees peuvent, en particulier, e^tre tenues responsables
des dommages et elles l'ont eectivement ete dans certains cas. Nous proposons ici un
modele principal-agent avec un secteur assurance et un secteur bancaire. Dans le cas ou la
banque possede une information complete des activites de l'entreprise, nous montrons que
les regles de responsabilite limiteemenent a des niveaux d'investissement et de negligence
trop eleves que peut par ailleurs corriger adequatement la pleine responsabilisation de
la banque. Cette rationalisation des lois sur la responsabilite des pre^teurs doit e^tre
reexaminee car de maniere generale, les banques font face a des problemes d'agence
[selection adverse et risque moral] dans leurs relations avec les entreprises. Dans le
cas de la selection adverse, la pleine responsabilite de la banque menerait a un sous-
investissement dans les entreprises concernees. La responsabilite partielle est preferable
mais peut s'averer insusante pour implementer la solution optimale de second rang.
Dans le cas du risque moral, la pleine responsabilite de la banque entra^nerait trop
frequemment le retrait de la banque et donc la non-realisation du projet tout en n'assurant
pas assez souvent le bon niveau d'eort dans la prevention d'accident environmental. La
responsabilite partielle pourrait dans certains cas implementer la solution optimale de
second rang. Mais le niveau de responsabilite partielle necessaire pour induire le bon
niveau d'eort peut e^tre trop eleve pour que le nancement du projet soit protable pour
la banque. Nous concluons par une discussion des implications de nos resultats pour la
determination des regles de responsabilite en matiere de dommages environmentaux.
Mots cles: risques environnementaux, pollution, responsabilite du pre^teur, banque,
CERCLA.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The polluter pay principle in the domain of environmental risks, and in particular
pollution, is now widely accepted. Recently, eorts have focused on the diculties
encountered to fully compensate the pollutees because of an unidentiable polluter,
invalid insurance or limited liability for example. This has led in a rst stage to the
creation of funds nanced by taxes, such as Fipa and Superfund, to guarantee a quick
indemnication of the victims and quick depollution procedures. Germany has recently
adopted a law in this direction [Umwelthaftungsgesetz, 1990] and several European
countries have already such a system.
1
But little thought has been given to the incentive
issues which can arise in this context in particular in view of the rms' limited liability
constraints.
To mitigate the costs of these funds, the regulators have been given extended tools
to recover cleanup costs from the liable parties. The most explicit example is CERCLA,
the 1980 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act in
the US. CERCLA species that the parties responsible for cleanup costs following an
environmental accident may include, among others, the current and past owners and
operators of the facility. When a bank has been relatively closely involved in the
supervision or monitoring of a rm's activities, it may be considered by the courts as an
operator and therefore liable for cleaning up the damages.
2
In the court case of US v.
Mirabile in 1985, the Mellon Bank was found liable for damages but the American Bank
and Trust and the Small Business Administration also involved in nancing the rm were
not: the court found Mellon Bank liable because it was signicantly more involved in
supervising the operations of the rm. In the case of US v. Maryland Bank and Trust
in 1986, the court found the bank, which held a mortgage on the property, liable for
cleanup costs on the basis that, at the time the pollution damage was discovered, the
1
See Smets (1992) for a discussion of these funds and Bianchi (1994) for an account of some recent
developments.
2
The meaning and limits of the security interest exemption rule have been largely discussed in view of
apparently conicting interpretations by the courts. See in particular Olexa (1991) and Strasser and
Rodosevitch (1993).
1
bank was the owner of the facility that it had purchased at the foreclosure sale. Finally,
in the case of US v. Fleet Factors Corporation in 1990-91, the bank was found liable for
cleanup costs on the basis that its participation in the nancial management of the rm
gave it an \ability to inuence" the overall management of the rm even if the bank was
not involved in the operations of the rm.
3
As one could expect, this last case sent shock
waves throughout the banking industry in the US and elsewhere.
4
In England, the government has recently rejected calls from banks to be protected
against the potential costs of cleaning industrial sites polluted by their corporate clients.
In the new law being discussed, banks are likely to be made explicitly responsible when
the companies they nance are found, even later on, to be responsible for pollution. The
idea behind the stance is that banks can more eectively than regulators have an inuence
over managements: it is therefore more ecient to make them responsible for a company's
pollution costs when the company cannot meet those costs, than to ask the regulators
to set up costly and complex environmental protection schemes. In Canada, the polluter
pay principle has been extended to a more general responsibility principle which makes
liable for cleanup costs the owners and operators of the source of environmental damage.
Although the laws remain partly unclear and the jurisprudence still fragmentary, it is
believed by many legal experts that a bank may be considered among the operators even
if it restricts its interventions to measures aimed at protecting its investments, loans or
other nancial interests. As in the US, the responsibility is in general retroactive, strict,
joint and several.
These developments are aecting the banking industry by their eects on the avail-
ability of credit, the cost of capital and the structure of banking contracts for rms in
3
For details of the judgment, see Journal of Environmental Law 4(1), 1992, 145-151.
4
The controversy prompted the US Environmental Protection Agency to propose in April 1992 (originally
proposed in June 1991) an interpretation, together with recommended tests, for the lender liability rule
which provided considerable protection to lenders [see Staton (1993) and Manko and Neale (1994)]. How-
ever, the EPA's nal rule was challenged, by the state of Michigan among others, in the U.S. Court of
Appeals. In the 1994 case Kelly v. EPA, the court held that the EPA did not have the authority to aect
the imposition of liability under CERCLA and rejected the EPA regulation as an interpretative rule [see
Simons (1994)].
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those industries which are sources of environmental risks. The banks have required that
the rms they nance be insured against dierent types of accidents which can aect
their solvency such as re, theft and civil responsibility. They are likely to ask more
and more for an extensive `environmental audit' before nancing a project, increasing
the cost of bank lending. Are they going to ask that their corporate clients be insured
against environmental damages, or will they prefer to insure their clients themselves?
This interaction between insurance and banking activities is just one example of a
more general phenomenon. The \new" banking industry is becoming more and more an
industry of risk management and its most pressing task may be to become signicantly
better at dening, managing and pricing risks.
5
The phenomenal developments in
derivative assets markets and more generally in securitization
6
now allow banks to control
and diversify, at a lower cost than before, the risks which their clients face or represent.
They end up playing a role quite similar to insurers. This may make them willing and
eager to compete for the traditional insurance business and also convince regulators to
let them do it.
The question of the responsibility of the banks is particularly interesting in a pe-
riod when the insurance and banking sectors are moving towards integration through
bancassurance or allnanz. The important recent surge in linking banking and insurance
businesses either through the creation of wholly owned subsidiaries, through acquisitions,
or through alliances or mergers seems to indicate that the movement is almost inevitable
and is likely to accelerate as regulatory constraints are bound to disappear under market
pressures. The movement towards holding banks liable, totally or partially, for the envi-
ronmental damages of theirs clients provides a case where the pros and cons of such an
integration can be discussed at the microeconomic level. Traditional arguments
7
relate
to economies of scale and scope, network or distribution economies, market power (in
the form of tie-in sales of mortgage and life insurance for example), growth potential,
5
The Economist [1992.05.02, 1993.04.10].
6
See Beaudry, Boyer and Poitevin (1993).
7
See Hoschka (1994).
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demographic factors, trends in savings, disintermediation, and also to large scale secu-
ritization allowing a reduction in the cost of nancing pools of borrowers rather than
individual borrowers as in traditional bank lending (a more recent phenomenon). We
want to stress in this paper another factor, namely the importance of agency costs in
banking and insurance, and to suggest the possibility of reducing them by coordinating
insurance and banking contracts. Major agency problems both in banking and in insur-
ance include adverse selection problems [the banker and the insurer want to elicit the
rm's truthful revelation of prot levels] and moral hazard problems [the banker and the
insurer want to induce their clients to make unobservable self-protection eorts to reduce
the probability of accidents]. From this perspective, this paper is a contribution to the
microeconomics of bancassurance.
8
From a more theoretical perspective, this paper brings together two strands of the
literature through the partial endogenization of rms' limited liability constraints. Until
recently, the insurance literature has neglected the eect of agents' limited liability con-
straints on the demand for insurance; Landsberger and Meilijson (1993) is a rare excep-
tion. Limited liability constraints have been considered in the principal-agent literature
[see Sappington (1983), and Demski, Sappington and Spiller (1988)] and in industrial or-
ganization [see Brander and Lewis (1989)] but these constraints are exogenous and ignore
the role of banks in their determination. We have also witnessed recently the develop-
ment of the theory of optimal nancial contracts based on informational asymmetries [see
Townsend (1979), Gale and Hellwig (1985) and Bolton and Scharfstein (1990)]. We will
study in this paper the interaction between banking contracts which determine nancial
constraints and the behavior of rms in their choice of insurance and in their choice of
safety activities.
9
8
Although we concentrate here on the environmental risks associated with bank loans to rms, there are
many other circumstances under which banking contracts and insurance contracts interact. One example is
the housing loans to households with compulsory insurance clauses. Another example is loans to business
with insurance provisions.
9
This paper is also related to the literature which has studied a particular type of externalities, namely
negative externalities which appear only with some probability [see Koenig (1985) and Sandler and Sterbenz
(1988)].
4
The organization of the paper and our main results are as follows. Section 2 is devoted
to the presentation of the basic model which is a two-period model with investment in
both periods and an eort variable aecting the probability of an environmental accident.
This model will enable us to address two incentive issues raised by the lender liability
rule under CERCLA.
10
We analyze in section 3 the case where the rm's prot and eort are observed by the
bank [perfect monitoring] but not by the insurance sector. The underlying assumption
is that the bank has indeed invested, on the basis of a cost-benet analysis not modeled
here, in a monitoring technology which allows it to observe perfectly the activities of
the rm; but the insurer has not done so, hence the dierence in the information of the
two principals. We show that if insurance is not compulsory, the rm will not want to
become insured. This implies that the social cost of an accident will not be internalized. If
insurance is compulsory, the social cost of an accident is internalized but we still may have
an equilibrium with an inecient level of eort because limited liability constraints may
make an eort inducing insurance contract impossible [even if the insurance contract has
preseance on the banking contract]. In the absence of compulsory insurance, the bank,
even if it is in de facto control of the rm, may choose to enforce an inecient [low] level
of eort in accident prevention because of the limited liability constraints. Conditional on
the level of eort, the bank lends more often than called for by the rst best investment
10
In the Court of Appeal's judgment in the U.S. v Fleet Factors case, Circuit Judge Kravitch wrote the
following.
\Our interpretation of the exemption may be challenged as creating disincentives for lenders to extend
nancial assistance to businesses with potential waste problems : : :. As a result the improper treatment of
hazardous wastes could be perpetuated rather than resolved. These concerns are unfounded.
Our ruling today should encourage potential creditors to investigate thoroughly the waste treatment systems
and policies of potential debtors : : : The risk of CERCLA liability will be weighted into the terms of the
loan agreement. Creditors, therefore, will incur no greater risk than they bargained for and debtors, aware
that inadequate hazardous waste treatment will have a signicant adverse impact on their loan terms, will
have powerful incentives to improve their handling of hazardous wastes. Similarly, creditors' awareness that
they are potentially liable under CERCLA will encourage them to monitor the hazardous waste treatment
systems and policies of their debtors and insist upon compliance with acceptable treatment standards as
a prerequisite to continued and future nancial support. : : : Once a secured creditor's involvement with
a facility becomes suciently broad that it can anticipate losing its exemption from CERCLA liability,
it will have a strong incentive to address hazardous waste problems at the facility rather than studiously
avoiding the investigation and amelioration of the hazard." (italics added)
Journal of Environmental Law 4(1), 1992, page 149.
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rule because the social cost of an accident is not internalized by the bank. We show also
that rst best levels of eort and lending may be achieved in this context by making
the bank fully liable for damages or by making full insurance compulsory for the bank
rather than for the rm, avoiding in this manner the limited liability constraints [assumed
irrelevant for the bank].
We then consider, in section 4, a rst case of asymmetric information between the
bank and the rm, namely the adverse selection case in which the bank does not observe
the level of prot but does observe the level of eort by the rm while the insurer
remains uninformed of both the prot and the eort levels. We characterize the second
best optimum benchmark for this case, as a function of the social cost of public funds.
We then show that the propensity of the bank to lend in comparison with the social
optimum depends basically on the balancing of two eects, the undervaluation of the
externality on the one hand (leading to too much investment) and the undervaluation of
the social value of the rm's rent (leading to too little investment). Full responsibility
allows for a proper internalization of the externality but leads to insucient lending. We
characterize the partial level of responsibility which induces the appropriate (second best
optimal) initial investment decision (however, the renewal of the investment in period 2
may be insucient when the cost of public funds is low).
In section 5, we consider a second case of asymmetric information between the bank
and the rm, namely the moral hazard case in which the bank does observe the level of
prot but not the level of eort to prevent accidents. Again, we characterize the second
best optimum benchmark for this second case. We show that the banking contract will
be eort inducing less often than called for by the second best optimal rule and that,
conditionally on the eort level, there is overlending by the bank. We show that making
the bank fully liable for damages will not induce the optimal level of eort by the rm
as often as called for by the second best optimal rule; moreover, conditionally on the
level of eort, the bank lends less often than called for by the optimal rule. We then
characterize the optimal level of responsibility of the bank. It induces the second best
6
when the project is valuable enough. If not, responsibility cannot induce eort without
killing the project. Two instruments would then be necessary to reach the second best,
a level of responsibility and a subsidy for investment. We conclude in section 6.
2. THE MODEL
We consider a two-period model with a risk neutral rm, a risk neutral bank and
a competitive insurance sector. The rm has, each period, an investment opportunity
which costs F and produces revenue 
1
with probability  and revenue 
2
with probability
(1   ), with 
1
< 
2
and expected prot  = 
1
+ (1   )
2
. To keep the analysis
as simple as possible, we assume that the stochastic revenues are independent from one
period to the other and that the discount rate is zero.
By its choice of eort, e 2 f0; 1g, which has a [monetary] disutility  
e
, with  
0
<  
1
,
the rm can aect the probability of an environmental accident which creates a damage
d > 
2
. Let p
0
and p
1
be respectively the probability of accident if the eort level is zero
and one, with p
0
> p
1
. For simplicity, we assume that eort is exerted in period 1 and
that the accident occurs or not in period 2. All along the paper, we will assume that it
is socially optimal in a rst best sense to exert the eort level e = 1; in particular, under
complete information, it means  
1
   
0
< (p
0
  p
1
)d.
The rm has no equity and its limited liability constraints will be essential. For
simplicity, we focus on the case where, under complete information, the payment of a
fair insurance premium for the environmental risk would never create a limited liability
problem, that is p
1
d < p
0
d < 
1
. At the beginning of period one, the bank and the rm
negotiate a two-period loan contract. The insurer oers an insurance contract at the
same time as the bank oers the nancing contract. The timing of the interplay between
the bank and the rm is as follows :
7
Figure 1
period 1 period 2
                                 !                                              !
two-period choice realization second period realization realization or not
banking of of 
1
or 
2
lending takes of 
1
or 
2
of an accident
contract e if investment place or not if investment with damage d
The main issue addressed in this model is the extent to which the limited liability
constraint of the rm interferes with the externality problem. Note that the externality
problem raises two issues, the issue of its internalization and the issue of the choice of
an appropriate eort level. We examine the interaction of these various problems under
several informational assumptions for the bank and the insurance sector and we discuss
alternative economic policies.
3. FULL INFORMATION IN BANKING.
With risk neutrality, moral hazard variables can be controlled at no cost by appro-
priate penalties without having to give up any rent to the rm. When a limited liability
constraint is added, it may be necessary to give up a rent to the rm. Eort is induced
by rewards rather than penalties, which are bounded by the limited liability constraints.
Here the behavior of the bank, which under full information can expropriate any rent the
insurance sector might want to leave to the rm to induce eort, destroys not only any
incentive for eort but also any incentive to buy insurance.
Under our assumptions, the full information rst best allocation, which will be the
welfare benchmark in this section, entails clearly
11
e = 1 and an investment in both
periods if 2   2F   p
1
d   
1
> 0.
3.1 The Nash Equilibria
The bank oers a contract which species, for loans of F at the beginning of each
period, reimbursementsR
1
[respectivelyR
2
] at the end of period 1 if the prot level is 
1
11
We are more explicit in section 4 about the social welfare function used.
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[respectively 
2
] in period 1 and R
1
[respectively R
2
] at the end of period 2 if the prot
level is 
1
[respectively 
2
] in period 2. A bank contract can here be summarized by the
4-tuple (R
1
; R
2
; R
1
; R
2
). The bank is willing to oer a loan in both periods as long as its
expected prot is non negative, that is as long as
R
1
+ (1  )R
2
+ (1  p
e
)[R
1
+ (1  )R
2
]  2F  0 (3.1)
If an accident occurs, the rm must pay for the damages, at least up to the maximal
amount made possible by its limited liability. Since d > 
2
, it means that all its prot
will be taken away if an accident occurs.
The insurance sector which is competitive oers either a contract with a single
premium p
0
d paid in period 1 which fully insures the rm but induces no eort [e = 0]
or a full insurance incentive contract which induces an eort level e = 1. For maximal
exibility, we assume that the premia can be spread over period 1, s
1
, and period 2, s
1
2
or s
0
2
, according to the occurrence or not of an accident which is the only observable of
the insurance sector. To induce eort level e = 1, these premia must be such that:
s
1
2
  s
0
2

 
1
   
0
p
0
  p
1
: (3.2)
Because of limited liability and the fact that prot above 
1
is not observable by the
insurer, they must satisfy:
s
1
; s
0
2
; s
1
2
 
1
: (3.3)
Finally, because the insurance sector in competitive, they must satisfy the budget balance
constraint:
s
1
+ p
1
s
1
2
+ (1  p
1
)s
0
2
= p
1
d: (3.4)
An incentive compatible balanced insurance contract can be summarized by (s
1
; s
0
2
; s
1
2
)
satisfying (3:2), (3:3) and (3:4). We are interested in Nash equilibria of banking contracts,
balanced insurance contracts and rm's decisions.
9
Proposition 1: There exists no Nash equilibrium with voluntary insurance of the rm. k
12
Proof: All the proofs are given the appendix.
Is compulsory insurance the solution ? Compulsory full insurance creates the right
internalization of the damage. Because of complete information and the fact that the
rm's prot is completely expropriated in any Nash equilibrium, there exists no Nash
equilibrium in which the rm is induced to exert eort level e = 1 (since as (3:2) indicates,
such a contract must leave a rent to the rm in case of no accident). In the following,
we will interpret compulsory full insurance as giving priority to the insurance contract
over the banking contract. However, as the next proposition shows, there may not exist
an equilibrium with compulsory insurance inducing eort since, because of its limited
liability, the rm may not accept such a contract oered by the insurance sector.
Proposition 2: If
2
1
< p
1
d + (1  p
1
)
 
1
   
0
p
0
  p
1
(3.5)
there exists no Nash equilibrium with compulsory insurance of the rm and e = 1; but
there is always a Nash equilibrium with compulsory insurance of the rm and e = 0, with
lending if 2 > 2F + p
0
d +  
0
and without lending otherwise; conditionally on the level
of eort, the level of lending is optimal. k
Condition (3:5) can be rewritten as

1
+ p
1

1
+ (1   p
1
)(
1
 
 
1
   
0
p
0
  p
1
) < p
1
d;
where the right hand side is the expected cost of an accident for the insurer and the left
hand side is the maximal premium he can raise given limited liability constraints [the
premium must be less than 
1
in all cases] and given the need for inducing eort [the
wedge between the premium to be paid when there is an accident and when there is no
accident must be ( 
1
  
0
)=(p
0
  p
1
)]. As the externality is now internalized, the bank's
loan is optimal conditionally on the level of eort e [and therefore the bank lends less
often when e = 0 than when e = 1].
12
Note that this proposition is still valid if the insurance company has the same information as the bank.
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3.2 The Bank's Control and Liability
Given that the rm does not want to become insured and that compulsory insurance
is not always the solution because condition (3:5) may be satised for some projects, we
may wonder if giving the bank the de facto control of the rm might be the solution. Will
the bank request the rm to be insured before oering a loan? The answer is clearly no
since the bank will indirectly benet from the rm's limited liability and free ride on the
compensation of the damage. Furthermore, we can obtain the condition under which,
with no insurance, the bank imposes the optimal eort level. In all cases, the bank lends
too often in any Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 3: When it is in de facto control of the rm, the bank does not want the
latter to buy insurance. It requires the rm to choose an eort level e = 1 i  
1
   
0

(p
0
  p
1
). In all cases, the bank lends too often. k
Since  < d, the choice of e = 1 is made less often than called for by the rst best
rule. Furthermore, the bank lends too often because by the rm's limited liability it
internalizes imperfectly the social cost of an accident.
To summarize the rst three propositions, limited liability and the bank's expropri-
ation of the rm's rent or prot destroys any incentive for the rm to buy insurance.
Compulsory insurance of the rm may still lead to an insucient level of eort to pre-
vent an accident and putting the bank in de facto control of the rm alleviates but does
not eliminate the internalization problem and therefore leads to overinvestment in the
activities which create environmental risks. Would making the bank fully responsible for
the rm's environmental damages be the solution?
Proposition 4: With full liability of the bank or compulsory insurance of the bank, the full
information rst best allocation is achieved at a Nash equilibrium. k
The bank's liability disposes of the rm's limited liability constraint. The bank now
internalizes completely the externality and being risk neutral, it prefers the optimal level
of eort e = 1 that it can require from the rm because of its perfect monitoring of the
11
rm's activities. This solution is equivalent to compulsory insurance of the bank despite
the insurance sector's incomplete information. This is because the bank's risk neutrality
and the assumed absence of [relevant] limited liability for the bank would enable the
insurance sector to oer a balanced incentive compatible contract.
Given the above results, one may suggest that the proper solution to the full internal-
ization of the externality created by environmental accidents is to make the banks fully
responsible for damages if a rm they nance is found liable for cleanup costs. As we will
see in the next section, when the bank suers from agency problems in its relationship
with the rm, possibly because it chose not to invest in a monitoring technology which
would allow the observations of the rm's activities, this conclusion must be qualied.
4. ADVERSE SELECTION IN BANKING
We suppose now that the rm's eort is observable by the social regulator and the
bank but that they both face an adverse selection problem regarding the future level of the
rm's prot.
13
As for the insurer, he observes neither prot nor eort. We assume in this
section that the optimal level of eort in that context is always e = 1 and that this level
of eort is enforced by the social regulator. We characterize rst the social optimum to
be used as benchmark in this section, then the multiprincipal Nash equilibria and nally
we derive the level of responsibility which induces the bank to lend if and only if it is
second best optimal to do so.
4.1 The Social Optimum under Adverse Selection.
Because of asymmetric information, the full information rst best allocation is not
achievable anymore. The proper benchmark for our analysis is the optimum under
adverse selection. We will assume that there is a cost (1 + ) of public funds
14
and
13
Prots are typically dicult to observe. Not so much because they can be hidden in secret bank accounts
but rather because they can be diluted in subtle ways through dierent forms of organizational ineciencies,
through `superuous' perks or activities and through transfer payments to associated companies.
14
This cost comes essentially from distortions due to taxation: it cost (1+)T to raise T through taxes. The
value of  is non-negligible and considered to be of the order of 0.3 in developed countries and higher in
developing ones. See Jones, Tandon and Vogelsang (1990, chapter 3) for a recent review of the empirical
evidence.
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that the social welfare function [SWF] is utilitarian. Since the payments made by the
rm to the bank can be assumed to be observable by the social regulator and that the
cost F is common knowledge, it means that the prot of the bank is itself observable
by the social regulator. Therefore, that prot could be taxed, possibly in a lump sum
fashion, to reduce the social cost of distortions due to taxation. Hence, the bank's prot
enters the social welfare function as (1 + ) times that prot. If, as it will be the case
here, the rm's utility is not observable by the regulator, this utility enters the social
welfare function with a weight of 1.
15
Finally, the expected social cost of an accident
will appear as that cost times (1 + ) under the assumption that the consumers will be
reimbursed by the government for the negative externality which the cost of an accident
represents for them.
From the revelation principle, the social optimum is dened as the maximum of the
expected social welfare under the incentive and the limited liability constraints of the
rm [which is the only agent to have private information] and the individual rationality
constraint of the rm.
Clearly, whatever the level of prot realized in period 2, the rm will always pretend
that 
1
has been realized. As for the level of prot in period 1, the social regulator wants
to elicit its truthful revelation to reduce the rent of the rm; he may be able to do so by
making the probability of renewing the loan in period 2, which is the only instrument
he has, dependent on the level of prot revealed in period 1 and by making payments
in period 2 dependent also on the level of prot revealed in period 1.
16
Let 
i
be the
probability that the rm will be nanced by the bank in period 2 if 
i
2 f
1
; 
2
g is
revealed in period 1. As before, let R
i
and R
i
be the payments to be made by the rm in
period 1 and period 2 if 
i
2 f
1
; 
2
g is revealed in period 1. Accordingly, the incentive
constraint, the limited liability constraints and the individual rationality constraint of
15
More generally, we could assume that a portion k of the bank's prot 
B
can be so observed and
captured by the social regulator in which case, the bank's prot would enter the social welfare function as
(1 + )k
B
+ (1  k)
B
.
16
This context is quite similar to Bolton and Scharfstein (1990).
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the rm are

2
 R
2
+ 
2
(  R
2
)  
2
 R
1
+ 
1
(  R
1
) (4.1)
R
1
 
1
; R
2
 
2
R
1
 
1
 R
1
+ 
1
; R
2
 
2
 R
2
+ 
1
9
>
=
>
;
(4.2)
[
1
 R
1
+ 
1
(  R
1
)] + (1  )[
2
 R
2
+ 
2
(  R
2
)]   
1
 0: (4.3)
The prot of the bank is given by the following, assuming that the payments by the rm
are made even when an accident occurs:
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 F + [R
1
+ 
1
(R
1
  F )] + (1  )[R
2
+ 
2
(R
2
  F )]: (4.4)
The social welfare function can be written as
(1 + )

 F + [R
1
+ 
1
(R
1
  F )] + (1  )[R
2
+ 
2
(R
2
  F )]  p
1
d

+

[
1
 R
1
+ 
1
(  R
1
)] + (1   )[
2
 R
2
+ 
2
(  R
2
)]

   
1
that is as
(1 + )

(   F )(1 + 
1
+ (1   )
2
  p
1
d)

  

   R
1
  (1   )R
2
+ 
1
(  R
1
) + (1  )
2
(  R
2
)

   
1
:
It increases with R
1
, R
2
, R
1
and R
2
and therefore lettingR
1
= R
2
= 
1
,
18
we obtain from
the incentive compatibility constraint (4:1), R
2
= R
1
 
1
( 
1
)+
2
( 
1
) which, when
17
This assumption has no eect on the characterization of the second best optimum since both the bank's
prot and the cost of an accident have the same weight in the social welfare function.
18
That R
1
= R
2
= 
1
is part of a social optimum can be shown, as in Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), as
follows. Substituting (4:1) in the social welfare function, we obtain
(1 + )
h
(  F )(1 + 
1
+ (1  )
2
)
i
  
h
  R
1
+ 
1
(  R
1
)
i
   
1
:
It increases with 
2
and therefore 
2
= 1 and only the sum (R
2
+ R
2
) matters. Maximizing the social
welfare function with respect to R
1
and R
1
leads to maximizing R
1
+ 
1
R
1
subject to the limited liability
constraints (4:2) and the individual rationality constraint (4:3); if (4:3) is not binding, then R
1
= R
1
= 
1
since 
1
 1; if it is binding, then R
1
= 
1
and R
1
=     
1
+ 
1
(   
1
).
14
substituted in the individual rationality constraint (4:3), leads to R
1
   
1
+
1
( 
1
).
Hence, using the limited liability constraints (4:2), we have
R
1
= minf
1
;     
1
+ 
1
(   
1
)g:
If minf
1
;     
1
+ 
1
(   
1
)g = 
1
, then the individual rationality [IR] constraint is
not binding since the limited liability [LL] constraint prevents the social regulator from
making it binding. If minf
1
;     
1
+ 
1
(   
1
)g =     
1
+ 
1
(   
1
), then the
individual rationality [IR] constraint is binding in which case the social regulator cannot
capture the rm's total prot when prot is low. Whether the IR constraint is binding
or not depends not only on the parameters (
1
; 
2
;  
1
) but also on the chosen value of

1
. To illustrate the diculties or ineciencies that full banking responsibility leads to
in this context of asymmetric information, we will assume that  
1
<  
1
and therefore
concentrate on the more interesting subcase in which the individual rationality constraint
of the rm is never binding because the limited liability constraints will be binding rst.
19
Hence R
1
= 
1
, R
1
= R
2
= 
1
, R
2
= 
1
  
1
(   
1
) + 
2
(   
1
) Substituting into the
individual rationality constraint (4:3) and in (4:4), we obtain the rent R(
1
; 
2
) captured
by the rm under asymmetric information and the bank's prot 
B
(
1
; 
2
) as functions
of the characteristics of the renancing rule (
1
, 
2
).
R(
1
; 
2
) = (1  )(
2
  
1
) + 
1
(   
1
)   
1
= (1 + 
1
)(   
1
)   
1

B
(
1
; 
2
) = 
1
(1 + 
1
) + (1  )(
2
  
1
)  F (1 + 
1
+ (1  )
2
)
(4.5)
The rm's rent is independent of 
2
since the payment R
2
made by the rm includes

2
( 
1
), the value for the rm of being renanced. The social welfare function can be
rewritten as a function of the renancing rule
W (
1
; 
2
) = (1 + )(
B
  p
1
d) +R(
1
; 
2
)
= (1 + )

(   F )(1 + 
1
+ (1  )
2
)  p
1
d    
1

  R(
1
; 
2
):
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In the framework of Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), there is no eort variable, that is p
0
= p
1
= 0 and
 
0
=  
1
= 0, and the limited liability constraints (4:2) imply that the individual rationality constraint (4:3)
is always met. Such is not the case in general when we introduce the cost of eort; hence our assumption
that  
1
<    
1
.
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Maximizing social welfare over 
1
and 
2
, we obtain:
Proposition 5: If  
1
<    
1
, then there exists
^
 dened by
(1 +
^
)(   F ) =
^
(   
1
)
such that the socially optimal investment rules are as follows:
 If  >
^
, then 
1
= 0, 
2
= 1 and lending occurs in period 1 i
(2   )(   F )  p
1
d   
1
 

1 + 
R(0; 1) > 0 (4.6)
that is i
(2  )(   F )  p
1
d    
1
+ (
B
  p
1
d) > 0 (4:6
0
)
 If  <
^
, then 
1
= 
2
= 1 and lending occurs in period 1 i
2   2F   p
1
d   
1
 

1 + 
R(1; 1) > 0 (4.7)
that is i
2   2F   p
1
d   
1
+ (
B
  p
1
d) > 0: k (4:7
0
)
Intuitively, if  > [<]
^
, the social loss due to the cancellation of the project in period
2 if 
1
is realized in period 1, (1 + )(   F ), is smaller [larger] than the social gain
coming from a reduction of the second period expected rent through the cancellation of
the project in period 2, (   
1
). Accordingly, the project is cancelled, that is 
1
= 0
if  >
^
 and renanced if  <
^
. The social welfare function is always increasing in 
2
,
since the rent left to the rm is independent of 
2
, and therefore 
2
= 1. First period
lending occurs whenever the social value of the project [either (1+)
 
2( F ) p
1
d  
1

when  <
^
 and 
1
= 
2
= 1, or (1 + )
 
(2   )(   F )  p
1
d    
1

when  >
^
 and

1
= 0 and 
2
= 1] is larger than the social cost of the rent R(
1
; 
2
). In other words, if
the individual rationality constraint is not binding no matter what the investment policy
chosen is, that is if  
1
is small enough [less than  
1
], then a rent is always left to the
16
rm and the socially optimal investment rule depends on the social cost of public funds.
If that cost is high [ >
^
], the social cost of the rm's rent is high and therefore the social
regulator wants to keep it at a minimum; this implies, under asymmetric information,
that investment takes place in period 2 only if prot is high in period 1 in order for
payments made by the rm seeking renancing in period 2 to depend on the realized
level of prot in period 1. The prot of the bank net of the expected cost of an accident
may be positive or negative, hence the no lending decision if the social cost of public
funds  is suciently larger than
^
 when the bank's prot is negative; for such large
values of , (4:6
0
) is negative. If the social cost of public funds is low [ <
^
], the socially
optimal investment rule is to invest in both periods or not at all. Since 
1
= 
2
= 1, we
have R
2
= R
1
= 
1
and the payments made by the rm are independent of the realized
level of prot; the rm will get a rent of 2(   
1
)    
1
. The prot of the bank net of
the expected cost of an accident is 2(
1
  F )  p
1
d < 0, hence the no lending decision if
the social cost of public funds  is large enough to make (4:7
0
) negative.
4.2 The Multiprincipal Equilibria under Adverse Selection.
We are in the same situation as in the previous section regarding the position and
role of the insurer: there will be no Nash equilibrium in which the rm voluntarily buys
an insurance contract. Similarly, an insurance contract made compulsory for the rm
may not induce the proper level of eort. Therefore, we can concentrate on the case with
no insurance.
20
Given that the bank cannot observe the level of prot, it cannot oer a nancial
contract which would make the level of payments dependent on the level of realized prot;
it could only depend on the reported level. We assume that the bank's preferred level of
eort in that context is also e = 1 [that is as we will see ( 
1
  
0
) < (1  )(p
0
  p
1
)
1
].
In the spirit of Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), the nancial contract oered maximizes
the expected prot of the banker E
^

B
[which now is dened under the assumption that
20
Compulsory insurance of the bank would lead here to the same result as full responsibility of the bank
considered below.
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if an accident occurs in period 2, no payment is made to the bank], that is
E
^

B
=  F + [R
1
+ 
1
((1  p
1
)R
1
  F )] + (1   )[R
2
+ 
2
((1  p
1
)R
2
  F )] (4.8)
subject to the rm's incentive compatibility constraint (4:1), limited liability constraints
(4:2) and individual rationality constraint (4:3).
The characterization of the nancial contract oered by the bank follows lines similar
to the characterization of the second best optimal contract except that, contrary to the
social regulator, the bank does not take into account the social value of the rm's rent
and that the bank does not receive the payments R
1
and R
2
when an accident occurs.
Nevertheless the nancial contract, if oered by the bank, will specify R
1
= R
2
= 
1
[payments in period 2 are maximal under the limited liability constraints], 
1
= 0 [no
renancing if 
1
is realized in period 1], 
2
= 1 [renancing with certainty if 
2
is realized
in period 1], R
1
= minf
1
;     
1
g = 
1
[by the limited liability and the individual
rationality constraints and the assumption  
1
<  
1
] and R
2
= minf; 2 
1
  
1
g =
 [by the incentive compatibility and limited liability constraints and the assumption
 
1
<    
1
].
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This contract can be interpreted as a loan contract with a renancing
covenant as follows: the bank lends F in period 1 and the rm must pay , in which case
it is renanced for an amount F in period 2 at the end of which the rm pays 
1
if no
catastrophic accident occurs; if the rm's prots are too low in period 1, that is if prot is

1
, then the rm goes bankrupt, in which case the bank seizes the rm's observable prot

1
. The bank will lend whenever its expected prot is non-negative, that is whenever
E
^

B
= 
1
+ (1   ) + (1  )[(1  p
1
)
1
  F ]  F  0: (4.9)
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The proof that this contract solves the bank's problem can be shown as follows. From (4:1) we get
R
2
= R
1
  
1
(  
1
) + 
2
(  
1
) and therefore from (4:2) and (4:3), R
1
= minf
1
;   
1
+ 
1
(  
1
).
That R
1
= R
2
= 
1
is part of an optimal nancial contract can be shown as in the proof of proposition 5.
Substituting in (4:8) we nd
E
^

B
=  F +R
1
+ 
2
(1  )(  F   p
1

1
) + 
1
h
F + (1  )  
1
[(1  p
1
)  (1  )]
i
which implies 
1
= 0 and 
2
= 1 for both possible values of R
1
. Using 
1
= 0 and 
2
= 1, we obtain
R
1
= minf
1
;   
1
g and R
2
= minf; 2 
1
  
1
g. If  
1
<  
1
, the individual rationality constraint
is not binding but the rst limited liability constraint is binding. Therefore R
1
= 
1
and R
2
= .
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Proposition 6: If  >
^
, the bank, when it lends in period 1, lends in period 2 as often as
called for by the optimal renancing rule. If  <
^
, the bank, when it lends in period 1,
underinvests in period 2 since 
1
= 0 while 
1
= 1 is called for by the optimal renancing
rule. k
As we already noted, for a high cost of public funds and therefore a low social valuation of
the rm's utility level, the social optimum calls for the cancellation, for incentive reasons,
of the renewal of the lending contract when 
1
is realized in period 1, exactly as the bank
does since it faces the same incentive constraint. However, when the social cost of public
funds is low, the social optimum calls for the realization of the second period project
more often than the bank does because the social optimum program gives a higher value
to the rent captured by the rm.
Proposition 7: The bank lends less often in period 1 than the social regulator
 when  >
^
, if
p
1
(d  (1  )
1
) <
1
1 + 
R(0; 1); (4.10)
 when  <
^
, if
p
1
(d  (1   )
1
) <
1
1 + 
R(0; 1) +

(   F ) 

1 + 
 
R(1; 1)  R(0; 1)


=
1
1 + 
 
R(0; 1) +

(1 + )(   F )  (   
1
)

k
(4.11)
When  >
^
, the renancing rule is the same in the equilibrium and in the social
optimum, hence the rent is similar and equal to R(0; 1). The bank lends less often
than optimally when the undervaluation of the cost of the externality, p
1
(d  (1   )
1
),
is less than its overvaluation of the cost of giving up the rent to the rm, R(0; 1)  

1+
R(0; 1) =
1
1+
R(0; 1). The rst factor favors overinvestment while the second favors
underinvestment. When  <
^
, the renancing rule used by the bank diers from the
socially optimal renancing rule. Then the informational rent captured by the rm
is higher in the social optimum, R(1; 1) = 2(   
1
)    
1
, than in the equilibrium,
R(0; 1) =    
1
   
1
. The bank lends less often than called for by the social optimum
19
if its undervaluation of the cost of the externality, p
1
(d   (1  )
1
) is smaller than its
overvaluation of the cost of giving up the rent R(0; 1) to the rm plus the dierence
between the forgone surplus induced by its renancing policy, (   F ), and the social
value of the rm's rent dierential between the optimal renancing policy and its own,
R(1; 1) R(0; 1). The additional term is positive, by denition of
^
, when  <
^
. Hence,
the bank is more likely to underinvest when the social cost of public funds is small than
it is when this cost is large.
4.3 The Bank's Liability under Adverse Selection.
Imputing full responsibility for environmental damage to the bank would be excessive
and would lead in period 1 to insucient lending. For large , the bank renews the lending
contract in period 2 as often as called for by the second best optimum but, although
the externality is now properly internalized, it remains that the bank underestimates
the social value of the rm's rent and does not lend often enough in period 1.
22
For
small , the second best optimum calls for the renewal of the lending contract while
the bank renews it only if 
2
is realized in period 1. The proper internalization of
the externality does not help solving this second period ineciency and again leads to
insucient lending.
23
In both cases, an appropriate partial internalization of the externality can lead to
the proper rst period lending level. If we require that the bank pays d if an accident
occurs, then, replacing (1  )p
1

1
by p
1
d in (4:9) and comparing the new decision rule
of the bank with the optimal investment rules given by (4:7) and (4:6),
24
we obtain:
22
Condition (4:10) reduces to 0 <
1
1+
R(0;1) which is always satised.
23
Condition (4:11) reduces to 0 <
1
1+

R(0; 1) +
h
(1 + )(   F )  (   
1
)
i
which, by denition of
^
,
is satised when  <
^
.
24
Alternatively, we can determine  from (4:11) and (4:10) by replacing (1   )
1
by d in both cases and
the < sign by the = sign.
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If  >
^
,
 = 
1
= 1  
1
(1 + )p
1
d
R(0; 1) (4.12)
If  <
^
,
 = 
2
= 1 
1
(1 + )p
1
d
 
R(0; 1) +

(1 + )(   F )  
 
R(1; 1)  R(0; 1)

(4.13)
Clearly, 
2
< 
1
< 1. In the case of a low cost of public funds, the responsibility of the
bank induces the second best lending decision in period 1 but lending in period 2 still
does not take place when 
1
is realized in period 1 contrary to the second best optimal
rule. The bank which dislikes, more than the social regulator, giving up a rent to the
rm creates a more important ineciency distortion in the lending rule to mitigate the
informational rent which is more costly to the bank than to the social regulator. The
social regulator would favor no distortion [because  is small] but, in determining the
optimal level of responsibility, must take as given the structure of the contract chosen by
the bank. Summarizing, we have:
Proposition 8: Full responsibility induces insucient lending in period 1. Partial respon-
sibility dened by a payment d induces the optimal rst period lending rule if  = 
1
for  >
^
, achieving the second best, and if  = 
2
< 
1
for  <
^
, in which case it
remains that the bank does not renew the contract often enough (it renews it only when

2
is realized in period 1). k
Partial responsibility level 
2
is smaller than partial responsibility level 
1
because two
factors contribute to underlending by the bank when  <
^
, the undervaluation of the
social value of the rm's rent and the non-renancing of the rm if 
1
is realized in period
1, while only the rst factor is present when  >
^
.
5. MORAL HAZARD IN BANKING
We suppose now that the rm's prot is observable by the social regulator and the
bank but that both face a moral hazard problem regarding the level of the rm's eort.
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As for the insurer, he again observes neither prot nor eort. We characterize rst the
social optimum to be used as benchmark in this section, then the multiprincipal Nash
equilibria and nally we derive the optimal responsibility policy.
5.1 The Social Optimum under Moral Hazard.
The proper benchmark for our analysis is now the optimum under moral hazard. For
the same reasons as in the previous section, the prot of the bank and the expected social
cost of an accident enter the social welfare function with a weight of (1 + ) while the
rm's utility enters with a weight of 1. Again, the optimal program will minimize the
rent left to the rm because of the dierent weights in the social welfare function.
The rm will choose e = 1 i it nds interesting to incur the cost  
1
, that is i the
wedge between its utility in the two states [accident or no accident] is large enough, that
is i:
(1  p
1
)[   (R
1
+ (1  )R
2
)]   
1
 (1  p
0
)[   (R
1
+ (1   )R
2
)]   
0
or i
R
1
+ (1   )R
2
   
 
1
   
0
p
0
  p
1
: (5.1)
The limited liability constraints of the rm are still given by (4:2) and its individual
rationality constraint is now given by
   R
1
  (1   )R
2
+

(1  p
e
)[   (R
1
+ (1   )R
2
)]   
e

 0: (5.2)
Distortions created by moral hazard will occur only when the combination of the limited
liability constraints and the incentive compatibility constraint require to give up a (costly)
rent to the rm. Incentive compatibility and  > 0 requires that (5:1) be binding and
limited liability requires R
1
+ (1  )R
2
 . Therefore, if
R    
1
+ (1  p
1
)
 
1
   
0
p
0
  p
1
;
is positive, that is if the cost of eort  
1
is large enough,
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then the last term of (5:2) is
positive for e = 1;  > 0 then requires that R
1
+ (1   )R
2
=  but nevertheless, the
25
More precisely if  
1
> [(1  p
1
)=(1  p
0
)] 
0
which implies that R > 0.
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positive rent R is given up to the rm. If R < 0, that is if the cost of eort is suciently
small, then the limited liability constraints are not binding
26
and it is possible to extract
all the rent from the rm [(5:2) is then satised with an equality] and the rst best can
be achieved. In the following, we concentrate on the more interesting case where R > 0.
Under the social optimum contract, the bank's prot is therefore
 + (1   p
e
)(R
1
+ (1  )R
2
)  2F (5.3)
and the rm gets a rent equal to R i e = 1.
Proposition 9: The social optimum entails e = 1 i
(p
0
  p
1
)d   
1
   
0
+

1 + 
R (5.4)
and an investment rule dened as follows:
 if e = 1, invest in both periods i
2   2F   p
1
d   
1
 

1 + 
R  0 (5.5)
 if e = 0, invest in both periods i
2   2F   p
0
d    
0
 0: k (5.6)
Proposition 9 diers from the rst best rule because of the need to give up an informa-
tional rent to the rm to induce it to choose e = 1. Both when making the investment
decision and deciding on the optimal eort level, the social cost

1+
R of this rent must
be added to the other costs (noting however that a rent is needed only when e = 1 is
induced). As the cost of public funds  decreases, the cost of giving up a rent to the rm
decreases also and the condition under which it is optimal to exert a high eort level
converges to the condition under which it is optimal to do so under full information. As
the cost of public funds  increases, the cost of giving up rents to the rm increases also
26
The wedge created in order to induce the rm to choose e = 1 is sucient to cover the cost of the high
level of eort.
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and the condition under which it is optimal to exert a high eort level converges to that
condition under which, as we will see below, it is in the interest of the bank to induce
such an eort level when it is made fully liable for damages.
5.2 The Multiprincipal Equilibria under Moral Hazard.
The bank cannot observe the level of eort but perfectly observes prot. Hence, it
can oer a nancial contract which makes the level of payments dependent on the level
of realized prot. If the nancial contract oered is not eort inducing, then the bank
captures all the prot net of  
0
. If the bank decides to make the contract eort inducing,
then it must give up a rent to the rm.
As for the position and role of the uninformed insurer, we are in a similar situation
as in the previous sections. There will be no Nash equilibrium in which the rm will
voluntarily buy an insurance contract. Therefore we can concentrate on equilibria with
no insurance. From (5:1), (5:2) and (5:3), the bank's prot, when it induces e = 1 [a rent
is then left to the rm and the individual rationality constraint (5:2) is not binding], is
given by
 + (1   p
1
)(  
 
1
   
0
p
0
  p
1
)  2F (5.7)
and, when it induces e = 0 [no rent is then left to the rm and (5:1) does not hold but
(5:2) is binding], is given by
    
0
+ (1   p
0
)   2F:
Proposition 10: The bank induces eort less often than called for by the second best
optimal rule. When it induces e = 1, the bank lends less often than called for by the
second best optimal investment rule i
p
1
(d  ) <
R
1 + 
:
When it induces e = 0, then it lends more often than called for, conditionally on e = 0,
by the second best optimal investment rule. k
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Proposition 10 balances two eects. On the one hand, the bank undervalues the cost of
the externality since it values it at p
1
 rather than at p
1
d; this leads the bank to lend too
much and to induce eort less often than optimally. On the other hand, the bank values
at R the cost of the rent left to the rm when socially it is valued at

1+
R; this leads
the bank to lend too little and to induce eort less often than optimally. The two eects
tend to reduce the eort level induced by the bank. But they have opposite impacts on
the level of lending. When the bank induces e = 0, then only the rst eect is present
and therefore the bank lends too much. Is bank's liability the solution ?
5.3 The Bank's Liability under Moral Hazard.
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Consider the case where the social optimum requires the realization of a given project
with e = 1. If, with no responsibility, the bank does not want to nance the project with
e = 1, it is because the negative rent eect is greater than the positive externality eect.
The optimal investment decision could only be obtained by subsidizing the bank if the
investment is realized. Making the bank responsible would decrease its expected prot
and certainly not induce it to nance the project.
A more interesting case is the following: suppose that when it is not liable for
environmental damages, the bank is willing to nance the project with e = 0. Increasing
the bank's responsibility could convince it to induce the appropriate choice of eort
because of the greater loss it is now incurring if an accident occurs. However, it is clear
that for levels of responsibility close to zero, the bank is not going to induce e = 1; for
such a high level of eort to be induced, the level of responsibility of the bank must reach
a certain threshold that we label 
3
below. But at that level of responsibility, the bank is
willing to nance the project i its prot is non negative. Because the bank overvalues,
in comparison with the social regulator, the cost of the rm's rent, it is possible for the
bank's expected prot to be negative when the level of responsibility reaches 
3
(in which
case the project will not be nanced by the bank) even if the project is socially valuable
27
Compulsory insurance for the bank is very similar here to the bank's liability but may not induce eort
from the rm for the same reason as in Proposition 2.
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with e = 1.
Full responsibility leads to e = 1, that is to a decision of the bank to induce the rm
to choose a high level of eort, i
(p
0
  p
1
)d >  
1
   
0
+R: (5.8)
The bank will accept to lend i 2   2F   p
1
d    
1
  R  0 when e = 1 and i
2   2F   p
0
d    
0
 0 when e = 0. Because of the rent eect, full responsibility is
excessive from the point of view of investment since it kills the investment too often
[under full responsibility, the bank induces e = 1 and lends i R < minf(p
0
  p
1
)d +
( 
0
   
1
); 2   2F   p
1
d    
1
g] while, from (5:8) and (5:4), it still leads to low eort
too often.
Consider now partial responsibility. As before, let d be the payment imposed by
the law to the bank if an accident occurs. Then the smallest responsibility level  which
leads the bank to induce e = 1 is dened from (5:8) by
(p
0
  p
1
)d =  
1
   
0
+R (5.9)
that is
 = 
3
=
 
1
   
0
+R
(p
0
  p
1
)d
: (5.10)
However, imposing responsibility level 
3
is the correct policy only if it does not lead to
the cancellation of the project, that is only if the bank's prot remains non negative.
The cancellation of the project will happen despite the fact that the project with e = 1
is socially valuable if 2   2F   p
1

3
d    
1
 R < 0, that is if
(
p
0
p
0
  p
1
 

1 + 
)R > p
1
(d 
 
1
   
0
p
0
  p
1
) (5.11)
which is clearly possible.
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By looking for the optimal internalization of the externality,
one runs the risk of killing the project by choosing too large a value of . The highest
28
In particular, condition (5:11) holds if the social value of eort is low, that is if (p
0
  p
1
)d  ( 
1
   
0
) is
small [since
p
0
p
0
 p
1
> 1 >

1+
].
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responsibility level  for which the bank will nance the project with e = 1 is
 = 
4
=
2    
1
  2F  R
p
1
d
: (5.12)
If 
3
> 
4
, the project would not be nanced by the bank. It is however possible that
the project is socially valuable with e = 0. The highest responsibility level  for which
the bank will nance the project with e = 0 is
 = 
5
=
2    
0
  2F
p
0
d
(5.13)
which is larger than 1 if the project is socially valuable with e = 0 and less than 1
otherwise. Summarizing, we have:
Proposition 11: If 
3
< 
4
, the second best is achieved [the project is realized with e = 1]
by partial responsibility of the bank as dened by 
3
. If 
3
> 
4
, partial responsibility
of the bank cannot induce the appropriate eort level without killing the project. It is
optimal to kill the project i social welfare with e = 0 is negative (that is if 
5
< 1).
Otherwise, a no responsibility policy is called for. k
If 
3
> 
4
, the project is socially valuable but the liability level necessary to induce e = 1
would kill the project. In that case, the second best could only be achieved with two
instruments, for example with punitive liability combinedwith a subsidy if the investment
is undertaken.
6. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
We have derived separately the equilibrium and the (second best) optimum under
complete information and when the bank (as well as the social regulator) suers from
moral hazard or adverse selection. Similar economic results would appear in the more
general model with moral hazard and adverse selection simultaneously. Limited liability
and risk neutrality imply that a rm, even if it is made liable for its environmental
damage, will prefer to run the risk of bankruptcy rather than become insured even for a
fair insurance premium. Moreover, it may choose to exert insucient eort to decrease
the probability of an environmental accident since it undervalues the social cost of an
27
accident. These factors lead to overlending by the bank. In the context of perfect
monitoring of the rm by the bank, the bank's full liability for environmental damage
when the rm is unable to pay the cleanup cost or indemnify the pollutees, provides the
appropriate internalization of the externality and leads to optimal lending and safety
eort behavior. Reaching the deep pocket of the bank solves the nancial problem, but
also leads to eciency by suppressing the impact of the rm's limited liability.
However, banks suer from various asymmetries of information with respect to the
rms they nance. Agency costs are created which alter the behavior of the bank and
the rm. The agency relationship obliges the bank to give up to the rm informational
rents which the bank does not include in the benets when performing a cost-benet
analysis for investment purpose and for eort purpose. Accordingly, the bank has an
inclination to underinvest or to induce insucient safety care. This rent eect opposes
the externality eect for the investment decision and goes in the same direction as the
externality eect for the safety care decision.
In view of the rent eect, full liability of the bank, to correct for the externality, is
excessive for the investment decision and may be insucient for the safety care decision.
Imposing a high level of liability creates the risk of killing socially desirable projects.
In general, liability of the bank is not a sucient instrument to reach the second best
allocation when rents must be given up either to induce eort or to induce the truthful
revelation of prot levels.
Many of the assumptions were made to simplify the presentation and the analysis and
could be relaxed without aecting the nature of the results; in particular, 
1
and 
2
could
be made dependent, a discount rate could be introduced, eort could be a continuous
variable as well as p(e) and the rm might have been modeled as providing some amount
of equity. All along the paper, the risk neutrality assumption has exacerbated the lack of
interest of the rm to buy insurance. Risk aversion of the rm might create a voluntary
demand for insurance but would not aect substantially the other economic conclusions.
We have restricted the analysis to the case of a single bank and more generally of a single
28
creditor and since social eciency requires that the rent captured by the rm be as small
as possible, given that the cost of investment F and the payments made by the rm to
the bank were assumed observable, we therefore gave the bank the power to extract as
much rent as possible from the rm. The same analysis is valid also for a competitive
banking context, in which polar cases would correspond to a zero prot condition on the
banking sector, the usual competitive banking assumption, and to a lump sum tax on
the banking sector. In the rst case, the bank's prot is zero and the rm captures a
larger rent, a situation which would increase the distortions as compared with the second
best social optimum. In the second case, the government imposes a lump sum tax to
the competitive banks equivalent to their expected prot level when the rm's rent is
kept at its minimum level under limited liability and asymmetric information, a situation
which corresponds to the case analyzed in this paper. All situations in between these
two extreme ones can be analyzed using the same apparatus.
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Other extensions would be worthwhile to pursue. We have conned our analysis to
the case where the risks involved were well dened risks raising no diculties, beyond
the moral hazard problem, in the writing of insurance contracts. In practice, relying on a
compulsory insurance systemmight not be so straightforward in view of all the arguments
which can be invoked to invalidate such insurance contracts; this raises issues of possible
collusion between insurers and rms to escape a true internalization of externalities. In
the context of pollution externalities, it would also be particularly interesting to pursue
the analysis taking into account the diculties of determining the probability distribution
of severe environmental accidents. We must stress also the endogeneity of the information
structures of the agents, in particular the banks. It would be interesting to take into
account the way the allocation of responsibility aects the incentives of the banks to
acquire information on the rms' activities. Finally, it is often the case that eorts to
decrease costs or more generally to maximize prots aect negatively the eort devoted
29
It would nevertheless be interesting to pursue the analysis in the case of multiple creditors to raise the
issue of how to allocate responsibility among creditors. See Feess and Hege (1993) and Hyde, Rausser and
Simon (1995) for such analyses.
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to safety care
30
and it would be valuable to integrate this consideration.
Beyond these directions of theoretical research, we would like to summarize some
preliminary practical implications we can derive from our analysis. Clearly, the respon-
sibility system should be well dened ex ante in view of its interference with the banks'
lending policy. The economic analysis leads us to distinguish two cases: either there are
no serious agency costs for the bank or these costs are signicant. In the rst case, if
the environmental risks are well dened, full responsibility of the bank is appropriate
to ensure the internalization of the externality. If those costs are ill dened, then full
responsibility remains appropriate if the cost for the bank of dening precisely the en-
vironmental risks is small enough. However, there are cases or industries where such
information acquisition is likely to be very costly (there is also a free rider problem in
dening those risks) and would precipitate the withdrawal of external (banking) nancial
resources from those industries. One could advise that the government either claries
those risks or gives up making the banks responsible or at least fully responsible. We
have shown in this paper that when agency costs are signicant, partial responsibility
should replace full responsibility. Partial responsibility balances the need to internalize
the externality and the reluctance of banks to lend. Finally, in the case of risks which are
not well dened, and therefore of an insurance market which cannot be relied upon and
of possible excessive prudence of banks, it seems inevitable that ex ante authorization
for carrying those risky activities should be obtained from the social regulator and that
indemnication of the costs of an accident be covered by a governmental Superfund.
CERCLA and the related jurisprudence allocate responsibility according to the in-
volvement of the bank into the management of the rm: full responsibility if the bank
is involved and no responsibility otherwise. In view of our analysis, this would appear
appropriate if the involvement in management was equivalent to the case of well dened
risks and no (or small) agency costs, and no involvement was equivalent to ill dened
risks with or without large agency costs. Clearly, there is no obvious equivalence be-
30
See Laont (1994).
30
tween these concepts and this might be one explanation of the level of controversy over
CERCLA in the US and over similar legal attempts in other countries.
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Appendix:
PROOFS OF THE PROPOSITIONS
Proof of proposition 1: Consider a candidate Nash equilibrium with e = 0 and an
insurance contract with premium p
0
d paid in period 1 without loss of generality. Given
those values, the banking contract is such that R
1
= 
1
  p
0
d  
0
, R
2
= 
2
  p
0
d  
0
,
R
1
= 
1
and R
2
= 
2
since complete information enables the bank to saturate the
rm's individual rationality constraint. The rm's expected prot is therefore zero in
a Nash equilibrium because it has zero prot if there is no accident, since the banking
contract expropriates all its prot, and it has zero prot if an accident occurs, because of
limited liability. If, given the above insurance and banking contracts, the rm deviates
by not buying the insurance contract, its prot is p
0
d [it saves the insurance premium]
and therefore it will deviate and therefore voluntary insurance cannot be part of a Nash
equilibrium. And similarly for a candidate Nash equilibriumwith e = 1 and an insurance
contract with total premium p
1
d which could be paid over both periods. }
Proof of proposition 2: We are now in the case of compulsory insurance with the insur-
ance sector observing only whether an accident occurred or not. Let (s
1
; s
0
2
; s
1
2
) be
an insurance contract. The eort e = 1 will be induced if (3:2) is met. Because of
the unobservability of prot in period 2, we must have s
1
2
 
1
and s
0
2
 
1
. These
constraints can be ensured with the smallest premium in period 1 if s
1
2
= 
1
and
s
0
2
= 
1
  ( 
1
  
0
)=(p
0
 p
1
) which can be positive or negative. Budget balance then re-
quires s
1
+p
1
s
1
2
+(1 p
1
)s
0
2
= p
1
d, that is s
1
= p
1
d p
1

1
 (1 p
1
)[
1
 ( 
1
  
0
)=(p
0
 p
1
)].
Such a contract is feasible only if s
1
 
1
, hence condition (3:5) in the proposition [Note
that if the insurance company was able to dierentiate the premium in period 1 ac-
cording to the level of prot in period 1, a weaker but similar condition would hold].
Consider now a potential Nash equilibrium with e = 0 and an insurance contract such
that s
1
+ p
0
s
1
2
+ (1   p
0
)s
0
2
= p
0
d. Since p
0
d < 
1
by assumption, such a contract is
feasible. Because of compulsory insurance, the banking contract will be indexed on the
occurrence or not of an accident in period 2: R
1
= 
1
  s
1
   
e
, R
2
= 
2
  s
1
   
e
,
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R1
0
= 
1
  s
0
2
, R
1
1
= 
1
  s
1
2
, R
2
0
= 
2
  s
0
2
, R
2
1
= 
2
  s
1
2
. The bank lends if
R
1
+ (1   )R
2
+ [p
e
R
1
1
+ (1  p
e
)R
1
0
] + (1   )[p
e
R
2
1
+ (1   p
e
)R
2
0
]  2F  0;
that is if 2   p
e
d    
e
 2F and therefore, conditionally on the level of eort, it lends
optimally. }
Proof of proposition 3: Because it is risk neutral and can benet from the limited liability
of the rm if there is an accident, the bank does not want the rm it controls to be
insured. Indeed, for e = 1, the bank's prot is 2   p
1
    
1
  2F with no insurance,
and 2  p
1
d  
1
  2F with balanced insurance; hence the result, since d > . Consider
then the case without insurance. The bank asks for e = 1 if
2   p
1
    
1
  2F  2   p
0
    
0
  2F
that is if  
1
   
0
 (p
0
  p
1
) instead of the rst best rule  
1
   
0
 (p
0
  p
1
)d; hence
the eort level e = 1 obtains less often than desired. Consider now the lending policy. If
 
1
   
0
 (p
0
  p
1
), then e = 1 and the bank lends if  + (1   p
1
)    
1
  2F  0,
that is if 2   p
1
    
1
  2F  0 instead of the rst best rule 2   p
1
d    
1
  2F  0.
Therefore, the bank lends too often. If  
1
   
0
 (p
0
  p
1
), then e = 0 and the bank
lends if 2   p
0
    
0
  2F  0; again, the bank lends too often. }
Proof of proposition 4: Direct from the text. }
Proof of proposition 5: Considering (4:5), we have
@W
@
2
= (1 + )(   F )(1  ) > 0
which implies 
2
= 1; and
@W
@
1
= (1 + )(   F )  (   
1
)
= (   F )  [(1   )(   F ) + (F   
1
)];
a decreasing function of . Dening
^
 by
(1 +
^
)(   F ) =
^
(   
1
);
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we obtain:
(i) If  
^
, @W=@
1
> 0 implying 
1
= 1 [lending in the second period should occur
if it occurs in the rst period] and therefore R
2
= R
1
= 
1
. Lending in the rst period
should occur i the social welfare given by (4:5) is positive, that is i
W (1; 1) = (1 + )[2   2F   p
1
d    
1
]  [2(   
1
)   
1
] > 0;
[which holds i (4:7) holds] where the rst bracketed term is the unweighted total surplus
when 
1
= 
2
= 1 and the second bracketed term is the rent left to the rm because of
the limited liability constraint. The prot of the bank is given by
[2   2F   p
1
d    
1
]  [2(   
1
)   
1
] < 0:
The social welfare function is decreasing in  and  
1
.
(ii) If  >
^
, @W=@
1
< 0 implying 
1
= 0 [lending in the second period should occur
only if it occurs in the rst period and the prot level 
2
is realized] and thereforeR
1
= 
1
and R
2
= . Lending in the rst period should occur i the social welfare given by (4:5)
is positive, that is i
W (0; 1) = (1 + )[(2  )(   F )  p
1
d   
1
]  [   
1
   
1
] > 0;
[which holds i (4:6) holds] where the rst bracketed term is the unweighted total surplus
when 
1
= 0 and 
2
= 1 and the second bracketed term is the rent left to the rm because
of the limited liability constraints. The social welfare function is decreasing in  
1
; but it
decreases [increases] with  if the prot of the bank, equal to 
1
+(1 ) (2 )F p
1
d, is
negative [positive]; contrary to case (i), that prot may be positive in the present case. }
Proof of proposition 6: Direct from the text. }
Proof of proposition 7: If  >
^
, investment takes place in the social welfare program if
(4:6) is satised, while investment takes place in the bank's program if (4:9) is satised,
that is, using R(0; 1) =    
1
   
1
, if
(2  )(   F )  (1   )p
1

1
   
1
 R(0; 1) > 0: (A:1)
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Therefore investment occurs less often in the equilibrium than in the optimum if
p
1
(d  (1  )
1
) <
1
1 + 
R(0; 1):
If  <
^
, investment takes place in the social welfare program if (4:7) is satised, while
investment takes place in the bank's program if (4:9) is satised. Therefore investment
occurs less often in the equilibrium than in the optimum if
p
1
(d   (1  )
1
) + (R(1; 1)  R(0; 1) < (   F ) +
1
1 + 
R(1; 1)
that is if
p
1
(d  (1   )
1
) <
1
1 + 
R(0; 1) +

(   F ) 

1 + 
 
R(1; 1)  R(0; 1)


which completes the proof. }
Proof of proposition 8: Full internalization of the externality is obtained by replacing
(1   )p
1

1
in (A:1) by p
1
d; it leads to the bank's decision rule: invest in period 1 if
2(   F ) > (   F ) + p
1
d +  
1
+ R(0; 1), which is independent of . When  >
^
,
the optimum calls for lending if 2(   F ) > (   F ) + p
1
d +  
1
+

1+
R(1; 1). Clearly,
the banks invests less often than optimal. When  <
^
, the optimum calls for lending if
2(   F ) > p
1
d +  
1
+

1+
R(1; 1). Therefore, the bank lends less often than optimal if
(   F ) +R(0; 1)  

1 + 
R(1; 1) > 0: (A:2)
For  =
^
, this expression can be rewritten as follows:
(   F ) +R(0; 1)  

1 + 
R(1; 1)
= (   F ) +    
1
   
1
 
(   F )
   
1
[2(   
1
)   
1
]
=    
1
   
1
+ (   F )[
 
1
   
1
  1]
= (   
1
   
1
) 
(   F )
   
1
(   
1
   
1
)
=
^

1 +
^

(   
1
   
1
) > 0:
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For  smaller than
^
, the expression in (A:2) is even larger. For  >
^
, partial
internalization leads to optimal rst period lending if, comparing (4:6) and (4:9):
p
1
(1  )d =
1
1 + 
R(0; 1)
that is if
 = 
1
= 1 
R
B
(1 + )p
1
d
:
For  <
^
, partial internalization leads to optimal rst period lending if, comparing (4:7)
and (4:9):
p
1
(1   )d = (   F ) R(0; 1)  

1 + 
R(1; 1)
that is if
 = 
2
= 1 
(   F ) R(0; 1)  

(1+)
R(1; 1)
p
1
d
which can be written (4:13). }
Proof of proposition 9: Let us rst derive the social welfare when e = 1 is induced. We
must solve the following program
Max (1+)[R
1
+ (1  )R
2
+ (1  p
1
)(R
1
+ (1  )R
2
)  2F ] + (1 + )p
1
(   d)
+ [(   R
1
  (1  )R
2
   
1
) + (1   p
1
)(   R
1
  (1   )R
2
)]
s.t.
R
1
+ (1   )R
2
   
 
1
   
0
p
0
  p
1
   R
1
  (1  )R
2
   
1
+ (1   p
1
)(   R
1
  (1   )R
2
)  0
For  > 0 and   
1
+ (1   p
1
)
 
1
  
0
p
0
 p
1
> 0, the solution entails R
1
+ (1   )R
2
= .
Accordingly, the social welfare is
(1 + )[   2F + (1   p
1
)(  
 
1
   
0
p
0
  p
1
) + p
1
   p
1
d] + [(1  p
1
)
 
1
   
0
p
0
  p
1
   
1
]: (A:3)
Investment must take place if
2  2F +  
1
+ p
1
d +

1 + 
R
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where R is the rent captured by the rm.
If e = 0, the social welfare is
(1 + )(2   2F    
0
  p
0
d) (A:4)
and investment must take place if 2  2F +  
0
+ p
0
d.
And nally, comparing (A:3) and (A:4), e = 1 must be induced if
(p
0
  p
1
)d   
1
   
0
+

1 + 
R
which completes the proof. }
Proof of proposition 10: If the bank induces e = 1, its expected prot is given by (5:7)
which is equal to
2   (1  p
1
)
 
1
   
0
p
0
  p
1
  p
1
   2F:
Hence it will lend if
2  2F + p
1
 +  
1
+R
which, compared to the second best optimal investment rule (5:5), leads to the result
that the bank lends less often than called for by the second best optimal rule if
p
1
(d  ) <
R
1 + 
:
If e = 0, the expected prot of the bank is   
0
+(1  p
0
)  2F . So the bank induces
e = 1 i
(p
0
  p
1
) >  
1
   
0
+R
which, compared to the second best optimal condition (5:4), generates the result that
the bank induces eort less often. When the bank induces e = 0, it lends whenever its
prot 2  2F   p
0
  
0
is positive which, when compared to the optimal decision rule
(5:6), generates the result that the bank lends more often than called for, conditionally
on e = 0, by the second best optimal rule. }
Proof of proposition 11: Direct from the text. }
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